

Does Radical Political Orientation Lead to Political Distrust in the Public Election of 2019 in Medan?

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Abstract: Institutional and political distrust is often attributed to the increasing of radical performance among voters. This study analyzes the political distrust that appears in the 2019 concurrent elections related to the radical voter position associated with religious issues. The study examined voters in Medan – a city in Indonesia with a diverse culture and a divided political party providing the support of presidential candidates. The research uses interviews on key informant that plays a crucial role in radically moving voters and confirming it to their network. Using context analysis, we found that during the legislative and presidential elections in Medan, radical informant emerged more likely to be politically unbelievers, than informants claiming to have moderate political understanding. Our findings suggest that political distrust can be explained by the preference of the chosen informant.

1 INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's politics does not become acquainted with any radical or moderate cleavage that voters believe, but the emergence of radical political potential in Indonesia is influenced by ethnic or religious (Geertz, 1960; King, 2003; Mujani and Liddle, 2010). There are not many radical electorate studies, except for terrorism in Bali (Gurtner, 2016) and some other lokalism (Castle, 2001; Aspinall, 2003; Nordholt, 2005; Erman, 2007). Radical political orientation strengthened again during the election of the governor of DKI Jakarta in 2017 (Mudhoffi 2017; Hadiz, 2017), then general elections were discussed in various forums or media that were mobilized in identity politics and religious politics (Mery & Napang, 2018). In its development, voters are often presented as beings that are substantially different about beliefs, moral feelings, fears, and anxieties due to the growing political opinions during the elections (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013).

This study has shown that radical orientation raises differences from the moderate voters relating to the motives and needs underlying political beliefs and their judgment of elections and political parties. In this study, however, we focused on how similar the emergence of voters with radical and moderate

orientation to each other in their political stance. We are specifically concentrating on how the two different beliefs form political belief (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013).

Rising standards of Indonesian society since the 1997 reform, resulted in a group of middle-class voters appearing with moderate political views. They channeled his political choices to political parties that had helped to find work and sought rather than ideological political programs. However, not all that can be embraced by the winners of the election year 2014 to support the program of economic development. Political radical waves appear attributed to the dissatisfaction of the status quo, the mastery of Oligarkis, and the economic gap (Mudhoffi 2017; Hadiz, 2017).

These issues became the idea of floating voters in Indonesia which currently affects Islamic politics and democracy in Indonesia. The group protested the management of the election winners and community networks that supported him. They politicized issues leading to radical orientation and strengthening social inequality, education for young people with uncertain future. The issue became very interesting when it was packaged in the rhetoric that the Muslims became a heavily impacted group in a widely disseminated power at the local level.

We chose Medan as the location of the study because of the historical record of identity

movements based on religion and Ethnicity (Said, 1973; Castles, 1979; Langenberg, 1982; Kahin, 1985; Ariffin, 1993; KIPP, 1996; Reid, 2014; Rasyidin, 2016). A total of 67% of the people of the Islamic field of religion, other religions, and the election of 2019 were dominated by religious issues in the campaign material to convince the Islamic voters. The informant is derived from 7 prominent Islamic organizations and 3 female Muslim communities that are formed because of the common belief and equipped with a focus group discussion. The context analysis we use to assess the motives and voters needs that underlie their political beliefs and judgment on elections and political parties. We argue that the emergence of a radical selector expresses negative emotions about elections and political parties rather than the politically moderate informer. In addition, the Islamist voters had a less-than-like radical attitude toward candidates who came from the ruling party coalition rather than moderate voters. This suggests that political radicalism is negatively associated with political belief, regardless of the ideology it believes.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Political Radicalist

Extreme or radical politics emerge from beliefs that govern feelings of fear, anxiety, and uncertainty. Many people have a rigid conviction over something in the form of black and white, allowing them to provide political support for the simple solution of its complex social and political problems (Fernbach et al., 2013; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2018). This rigid belief is then translated in the form of intolerance to other minded groups that the lives of everyone in the world can be predicted so as to avoid threats (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006). Previous studies found that feelings of uncertainty emerged from weak leadership, the norm of consensus identified by radical groups (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010). Radical groups feel very confident about their own political truths and beliefs versus moderate groups (Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno, 2013). The fear that is in the radical group is more strongly convinced of the truth of their solids about life in the world (Anson, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2009).

Because of this process, it can be rationally understood that radical political actors tend not to trust the competition among political parties. They only trust the information about the world only from

its political ingroup, and are always suspicious of the information originating from the political party group and its surroundings (Hardin, 2002). Such thinking will always lead to opposition between ' us versus them ' which is competitive in many ways. Radical groups are always suspicious of one's political rights. The group strengthened as the increase of nationalism coincided with the increasing suspicion of certain ethnic and religious (Midlarsky, 2011). We reasoned that political radical actor were more likely to not believe in political establishment as well as display rejection of the victorious rulers in the elections.

2.2 Political Trust

Everyone who feels afraid and prejudiced, will always not only do not trust fellow citizens, but also political institutions. Belief in politicians and the overall political system always has the requisite to suit one's wishes. Everyone has always had suspicions to all politicians and political institutions that are likely to be unfair in decision making. Political belief is minimal, politicians and political institutions are at least not considered detrimental to society, but as a condition of necessity to maintain law and order. Thus, political belief was instrumental in determining the response of a citizen's attitudes toward the actions and demands addressed to the Government (Zmerli, Newton, & Montero, 2007). Political belief always means that one will evaluate the performance of politicians and political institutions positively (Misztal, 1996).

Studies show that the emerging radical orientation is always attributed to low belief due to conspiracy (Inglehart, 1987). Political mistrust is also related to policy evaluation and the tendency to vote for parties or opposition candidates (Hetherington, 1999). Everyone who supports the incumbent tends to have a high political belief than those who support the opposition. Unbelieving voters will be more interested in the candidates who are using an open, anti-government policy and attack campaign (Hetherington, 1999; Luks & Citrin, 1997). Political beliefs seem to be formed by political information and policy performance evaluation (Bianco, 1994) of screen perception.

Political belief does not last forever for individuals as well as society, politicians can be trusted because of the good performance and image of the policies he made according to the will of society. Political beliefs can also be gained depending on the efforts of politicians fulfilling the general prevailing rules on how they should

behaved. The image of politicians will be formed, including his personal life, through traditional and social media that will greatly form public opinion about the country.

Such political involvement resulted in widespread dissatisfaction than merely choosing and form non-conventional political participation. Some studies confirm that a lack of political confidence and increased alienation will elicit active protest behavior (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982; Pierce & Converse, 1989). Besides, research finds that the behavior of protest and involvement in protest is associated with unbelief (Abravanel & Busch, 1975; Citrin, 1977). Other studies have explained that political participation is conducted solely because of unbelief among politically interested individuals (Luks in Levi & Stoker, 2010), among those who do not have other participatory motives (Shingles, 1981), among those who expressed dissatisfied with the ruling government policy (Miller, 1974; Craig & Maggiotto, 1981), and among those who have a favorable attitude toward opposition leaders (Nilson & Nilson, 1980).

Focus our research on Medan and test whether voters tend to express unbelief in politicians. The city of Medan was chosen because it has a record of ethnic and religious events that elicit identity in local politics. Apart from the pluralism in Medan, there is a segregative ethnic location in some areas that competed very hard during the election year 2019. The political belief emerged relatively unexpectedly especially the presidential election with religious issues wrapped in religion. This research investigates a more specific manifestation of false

political belief, which is sentiment on anti-Islam related to radical and moderate political opinions.

3 METHODS

This paper discusses the phenomenon of radical orientation of voters due to political beliefs related to religious issues in the simultaneous elections of the year 2019 in Medan. The study used a qualitative approach to identifying the radical orientation and political beliefs of the figure and its network. We conducted a thorough interview with the main informant, which is 7 Islamic organiaations and 5 study communities formed by the similarity of beliefs and equipped with a focus group discussion to the experts who Associated. The context analysis we use to assess the motives and voters' needs that underlie their political beliefs and judgment on elections and political parties.

4 RESULT

4.1 Political Participation in Medan

Since the reform of the electoral system, Medan has a record not so good the number of voters present at the polling place. The lowest number 25.38% during the Medan mayor elections of 2015 and the highest occurred in 2004 by 78.21% which was the first election after system change and the organizers of elections. After that, voter participation present election tends to decline or below 70%.




Diagram 1: Election participation in Medan, 2004-2019 (KPU Medan, 2019).

Then, during the simultaneous elections of the legislative and the president in 2019, the participation rate of each rose to an average of 73% and 74.20%. The increasing electoral participation was not as much when the governor of North Sumatera was 2018 or 55.80%. In approximately one year, voters participated on the day of voting increased by 18.4%.

Concurrent elections of legislative and presidential/Vice presidents are divided into two coalition groups of political parties. The first coalition consisted of 7 political party winners of the 2014 elections (PDIP, Golkar, PKB, Nasdem, PPP, Hanura, and PKPI) called the Coalition of Indonesia Maju nominated Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin as president and vice president. While the second coalition consisted of a coalition of 4 political parties (Gerindra, MCC, PAN, and Democrats) nominated Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga S. Uno as president and vice president and referred to him as the Indonesian coalition of fair and prosperous. The two coalition groups held a very violent competition in society during the simultaneous elections of 2019. Voters are faced with two options relating to the choice of both political parties and legislative candidates simultaneously.

Table 1: Coalition for political parties and presidential candidates (KPU, 2019).

No.	Partai Koalisi	Calon Presiden/ Wakil Presiden
01	Koalisi Indonesia Maju	Ir. Joko Widodo – KH. Ma'ruf Amin
1.	PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)	
2.	Golkar (Golongan Karya)	
3.	PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)	
4.	Nasdem (Nasional Demokrat)	
5.	PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)	
6.	Hanura (Hati Nurani Rakyat)	
7.	PKPI (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia)	
02.	Koalisi Indonesia Adil dan Makmur	Prabowo Subianto – Sadiaga Solahuddin Uno
1.	Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya)	
2.	PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)	
3.	PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional)	
4.	Demokrat	

The very hard competition became one of the causes to increase the number of voters present at the polling place. In addition, voters split into two groups i.e. 01 selectors which led to the issue of government success and voters 02 by spreading identity issues in the theme of justice and prosperity.

According to some informant, the increasing number of voters present at simultaneous elections in 2019 (see Susila, Dean, Yusof, Setyawan, & Wajdi, 2019) is due to the following competition that is very hard to happen in approaching voters on the basis of religious issues. We focus on investigating the third cause to identify radical orientation phenomena and political beliefs from the figures and networks in the simultaneous elections of 2019.

4.2 Radical Orientation

The cause of the emergence of radical understanding due to feelings of fear, anxiety, and uncertainty so that voters provide support to politicians who provide a simple solution of complex social and political problems (Fernbach et al., 2013; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2018). Such a feeling was conveyed by an informer who was active in religious studies as follows.

"We know from community activities that religion is very important to choose candidates in the elections. If we choose the Unfaith, then our religion will not be noticed by the elected ruler. Not only for the HOUSE but the most important president also." (Informant 1, figure of the Islamic organization)

In line with the informant statement, a prominent Islamic organization stated that the mistake of choosing politicians and presidents would result in a life believed to be true by religion.

"Let's see, that leader could be called by politicians. The president was a politician so he was a member of parliament. They are if not Islam or fight for Islam, for what is chosen. We are just believing if it is not to be chosen because it will not fight for our religion. There are politicians and presidential candidates who are Islamic but practice defending non-Muslim interests". (Informant 2, figure of Islamic organization)

Affirmation of religious reasons used by voters because of no trust according to Islamic teachings submitted by the following informant.

"We can see in the media coverage, many were arrested by the KPK because of corruption. The election was useless, we chose the DPR, elected the mayor, elected the president, but still many were arrested for corruption. This government can be trusted, the wealth of the State is exploited by foreigners, but at the same time, the community is

also not prosperous. Check it out here, highway construction alone is not good, broken roads, floods, theft everywhere.” (Informant 3, a figure of Islamic organization)

Other informants add another description of the following opinion.

“I lack confidence in the 2019 elections then because it could be engineered. Election results in the media KPU change very quickly and much. I suspect this situation, as well as its implementation because many State authorities are participating in winning a certain candidate.” (Informant 3, a figure of the Islamic organization).

Differences of opinion on political choices were presented by an informant of a moderate Islamic organization figure.

“There is no link between religion and political vote. I know that we are Muslim, the vice-presidential candidate is “Kyai” who is also the leader of Ulama in Indonesia. Why doubt his religion? He (Jokowi) has been working for 5 years, he has been doing a lot of development, giving school assistance, if we are sick we can get free treatment. But not everyone is satisfied because there are still many people who do not have a job, or can not have medication when sick. But the government is already trying, there is no guarantee that new presidential candidates can solve the problem more quickly.” (Informant 4, the figure of Islamic organization)

A moderate-thinking selector conveys that elections are the media of presenting ideas and ideas during the campaign and will be evidenced after being elected.

“If some people feel anxious to vote because of ignorance, often religion is the reason. We must choose people who have ideas to address community problems, although religion is also important. Because the promise is debt, so the religious person promises to be kept. He had an important idea and religion was chosen, do not upside down.” (Informant 5, figure of Islamic organization)

Each religious figure has a target group that is often called a congregation or Ummah. In determining the choice, most of the congregation or Ummah, listening to the advice of a religious figure referred to as “Ustad” or the teacher of Koran. The congregation is grouped by location or friendship and conducts religious activities together within a certain agreed time. A member of the congregation speaks about his political choices during the 2019 elections as follows.

“In every Quran recite, Ustad always convey the choice of candidates who are religious because it will safeguard the interests of Muslims. I believe because I consider it true because the one that conveys is Ustad. I do not know what is political,

we chose candidates, but Ustad told us to choose a candidate who has the same religion as us. The government is now not defending the interests of Islam, many candidates from non-Islamic parties, the religion of the presidential candidate also doubted.” (Informant 6, a figure of the Islamic community)

An informant from the same community of worshippers adds the following explanation.

“Election results are often rigged. I saw it my self that a lot of votes were fraudulently voting places (TPS). We think so, the results are much rigged. Candidates who should win, are made lost. That means the election activity is not trustworthy.” (Informant 7, a figure of the Islamic community)

Different opinions are conveyed by an informant derived from a religious community stating the following.

“We routinely do the recite (Al Quran), listen to advice from Ustad. I believe that all people are good, so are the candidates of DPR (legislative) and presidential candidates. We must not impose our will because Islam is a peaceful religion. Have different options is the usual thing. Don't be hostile just because of differences in political choices in elections. Separating between “us” and “them”, it is not good, because we are human beings who have to be relatives and help each other. Islamic teachings like that, there is no teaching to hurt people have different faiths because they are also creations of God.” (Informant 8, community of studies)

Disagreements over the political choices determined by voters indicate a tendency to increase radical understanding for society. An expert informant states the following.

“At any time of the elections, always religious issues become very radical or increased. Everyday voters are faced with a religious and ethnic base in determining options. Most of the time, each candidate always displays the identity side to his or her selection rather than an idea and idea offer. Not a few voters are affected very quickly from the intake of identity issues that.” (Informant 9, academics).

4.3 Political Trust

Informants who have beliefs or influenced radical thinking tend to appear to have risen in number ahead of elections, as presented below.

“Initially I didn't care about the elections or the presidential election. I was invited by a friend to study. There i heard Ustad lecture and my friends convey that I should care about the people by the election to choose a candidate who has a party to religion. I continue to join them in every study.” (Informant 10, the community of studies).

Election events become media or means to disseminate a reason for disagreeing with a ruler or group that plays a very dominant role in the Government Mistrust is conveyed by the following informant.

"Political parties who are now in power, are often troubled by small communities. Difficult to get treatment, school costs are also expensive, there should be expenditure on textbooks, there should be expenditure for tutoring. Meanwhile, the job field is difficult, opening a business is also a lot of unofficial costs. Then do not vote the ruling political party." (Informant 2, figure of the Islamic community).

Other informant convey a different opinion. In his view, the political parties who won the elections should be given the opportunity in a certain time implementing the program.

"Today, the Government has provided health assistance to the poor. We know not all poor people who can be free to take medication. Many of the vehicles also, that is because of the behavior of the health centers and hospitals that are lazy to provide community service. So, the fault is not only in the political parties of the ruler, but the person must also be seen. We must not judge the whole person, wrong clay." (Informant 5, figure of the Islamic community)

An informant of the study group expressed the following statement.

"I still believe in the government and the winners of the elections then because they have worked to provide community service. There must be less in providing services, but it does not mean that we as citizens have to protest loudly with the radical way of making identities to attack them (Informant 8, the community of studies).

Some informant express his attitude in view and give his political choices during elections.

"Three years ago and during the last election, I gave the choice to one of the winning parties. But, I also don't get anything after they win. I wanted to find a job, it was very difficult. People close to me told me if I was wrong to select. So I redirect support to other political parties who nominate another president." (Informant 6, figure of the Islamic community)

"There are many reasons I moved support from ago. I see and feel after discussions with friends, they are not defending Muslims. Already know there are religious taking but still also chosen to be supported. I do not understand, but it can destroy their credibility including the (informant 3, figure of the Islamic community)

"I change my choice because I see the political parties of that ruler conspiring to support certain people who benefit them. Not for the sake of people. I'm just sure they must be one moment, who chooses it will regret it. So I am a member of

my members to choose candidates who are in the interest of Muslims ' interests." (Informant 7, figure of the Islamic community).

5 DISCUSSION

The findings of the informant indicate that two groups of political orientation are voters with extreme or radical and moderate beliefs. The radical-flowing voter mentions his disappointment with the treatment of the ruling group or that the ruling does not conform to his expectations and beliefs. The so-called radical-oriented group of voters tend to put political distrust to the ruler and will always look for different alternatives. The radical understanding that arises is due to feelings of disappointment with the daily conditions associated in their belief bases. A simple solution is to provide political support to the parties who offer the difference and are willing to accommodate the wishes they believe. Thus, the action of intolerance becomes very possible done to those different political beliefs.

The same truths based on certain beliefs are only sourced from internal or group themselves. Discourse discusses the ideas and ideas of solutions to specific problems that are very complex tend to be avoided. Radical-oriented voters are only interested in discussing the uniform idea of their circles. Dissatisfaction with the ruling political leader became the hallmark of the radical voter group. The radical orientation grouping is very possible to form through the identification of options ahead of the 2019 simultaneous elections in Medan city. As the findings of the key informant statement explaining that they do not believe the pledge of the presidential candidate even though the prospective deputy is a scholar. Similarly, the political party supporting the presidential candidate was not selected in the 2019 simultaneous elections in Medan city. They campaigned to give an influence to the congregation's Network (ummah) to keep it consistent with his beliefs.

The research findings affirm the similarity of the theory (Fernbach et al., 2013; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2018) which explains about political support will be given extreme voters only to candidates who have the same beliefs. The tendency of intolerance is seen when a radical-oriented group rejects all material conveyed by a political party incorporated in the supporting coalition of the incumbent presidential candidate. The intolerance is to reject any disagreements and avoid other community groups of different beliefs in the daily

Association. The radical group assessment considers the presidential candidate to be weak because the decision is always influenced by certain religious interests through the figure in the power circle. The importance of the influential figure, always weakened the struggle of the Islamic Group (Midlarsky, 2011). The findings proved that weak leadership led to an uncertainty that was identified by radical-oriented groups (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010).

While the moderate selector is the view that the ruler still provides the best service for the community regardless of the shortage. Moderate groups strongly believe that changes are very difficult to do quickly due to limitations. Harmony in social relationships becomes very important to maintain the individual's safety in managing their lives. The belief given by moderate voters to the ruling political party is based on the rationality of changes even if it is not yet able to solve community issues. Alignments to the ruling party coalition are based on a belief in a safe situation to coexist. Still provide the opportunity to the ruler because the moderate group feels that it has benefited a certain day of life.

Based on the findings of the informant explanation, the moderate selector considers the radical-oriented group to be disorientated due to its own belief. Every human being has the right to choose according to his belief even though it is different. But that distinction is not a reason for spreading anxiety and fear. Moderate voters are more likely to see ideas and ideas as well as evidence that provides benefits to individuals and communities, not because of the similarity of identity. The truth is not derived from its own beliefs to be the principle in maintaining tolerance for moderate voters (Toner, Leary, Asher and Jongman-Sereno, 2013). Moderate voters avoid opposition "we versus them", because each individual has a different view that should be respected.

The group of voters in the city of Medan that split into two groups, namely radical and moderate oriented was seen during the implementation of the general election year 2019. The response given by radical-oriented voters is choosing a coalition of government opponents' parties. Their position provides support to the fair and prosperous coalition because it relates to the dissatisfaction of the policy decided by the Indonesian Government or coalition forward. The evaluation was conducted through a general electoral mechanism and not an action that could reduce democracy at the local level. A very strong radical-oriented group spreads political

distrust to support the opposition or opposing government coalition. The findings confirm previous research (Zmerli, Newton, & Montero, 2007; Hardin, 1996; Misztal, 1996; Hetherington, 1999; Luks & Citrin, 1997; Bianco, 1994).

The presence of voters in the city of Medan during the general election of 2019 was increased (see Diagram 1) and took place peacefully, although the process of spreading ideas and ideas is not the basis of the decisive choice. Political mistrust is transmitted through the electoral mechanisms not by violent means or through street protests. The findings did not confirm previous research (Muller, 1977; Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 1982; Pierce and Converse, 1989; Abravanel and Busch, 1975; Citrin, 1977).

Results of the 2019 elections in the city of Medan showed that radical-oriented voters got more support than moderate voters. The Indonesian coalition for advanced who supported the presidential candidate in the state of Indonesia (01) received a vote of 542,221 (45.6%). Indonesian coalition of fair and Prosperous Prabowo-Sandi (02) received votes

About 645,209 (54.4%). The 8.8% sound difference is assumed to come from the radical-oriented voters in Medan city. Political beliefs appear relatively unexpectedly especially ahead of the presidential elections with religious identity-clad issues. The study found a more specific manifestation of the false political belief that the sentiment on anti-Islam was related to radical and moderate political opinions during the general elections. The protest action is channeled by radical-oriented voters through elections, not by way of street action.

6 CONCLUSION

The emergence of radical-oriented voters tends to increase during the 2019 general elections in Medan. The fundamental basis is that there is an institutional distrust regarding the issue of religious-clad identity in the context of voters' dissatisfaction at government policy. The radical-oriented selector has the preference of its choice to a coalition of political parties who do not nominate an incumbent president and propagate influence to networking in its community environment. While moderate voters, in numbers not as much as radical-oriented voters, still give political confidence to the coalition of political parties that nominate the presidential presidency. Although the competition was quite loud, voters

continued to use a democratic way of being present during the vote.

We argue that the emergence of a radical selector expresses negative emotions about elections and political parties rather than the politically moderate informer. Also, the Islamist voters had a less-than-like radical attitude toward candidates who came from the ruling party coalition rather than moderate voters. This suggests that political radicalism is negatively associated with political belief, regardless of the ideology it believes.

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