SAFE RPC - Auditing Mixnets Safely using Randomized Partial Checking

Stefan Popoveniuc, Eugen Leontie

2010

Abstract

Secure voting systems like PunchScan and Scantegrity use mixnets which are verified using Randomized Partial Checking (RPC). This simple and efficient technique can lead to privacy loss and may, in an extreme case, result in linking all the clear text ballots to the voters who cast them, thus completely destroying the secrecy of all ballots and circumventing the functionality of the mixnet. We suggest a simple technique, Secure RPC (SRPC), that uses RPC in a way that guarantees maximal privacy in all possible cases. We prove that SRPC does not asymptotically reduce the integrity offered by RPC.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Popoveniuc S. and Leontie E. (2010). SAFE RPC - Auditing Mixnets Safely using Randomized Partial Checking . In Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2010) ISBN 978-989-8425-18-8, pages 165-170. DOI: 10.5220/0002939601650170

in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt10,
author={Stefan Popoveniuc and Eugen Leontie},
title={SAFE RPC - Auditing Mixnets Safely using Randomized Partial Checking},
booktitle={Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2010)},
year={2010},
pages={165-170},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0002939601650170},
isbn={978-989-8425-18-8},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2010)
TI - SAFE RPC - Auditing Mixnets Safely using Randomized Partial Checking
SN - 978-989-8425-18-8
AU - Popoveniuc S.
AU - Leontie E.
PY - 2010
SP - 165
EP - 170
DO - 10.5220/0002939601650170