A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms

Hélène Le Bouder, Thierno Barry, Damien Couroussé, Jean-Louis Lanet, Ronan Lashermes

2016

Abstract

This paper presents the first side channel analysis from electromagnetic emissions on VERIFY PIN algorithms. To enter a PIN code, a user has a limited number of trials. Therefore the main difficulty of the attack is to succeed with very few traces. More precisely, this work implements a template attack and experimentally verifies its success rate. It becomes a new real threat, and it is feasible on a low cost and portable platform. Moreover, this paper shows that some protections for VERIFY PIN algorithms against fault attacks introduce new vulnerabilities with respect to side channel analysis.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Le Bouder H., Barry T., Couroussé D., Lanet J. and Lashermes R. (2016). A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms . In Proceedings of the 13th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 4: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2016) ISBN 978-989-758-196-0, pages 231-238. DOI: 10.5220/0005955102310238

in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt16,
author={Hélène Le Bouder and Thierno Barry and Damien Couroussé and Jean-Louis Lanet and Ronan Lashermes},
title={A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 4: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2016)},
year={2016},
pages={231-238},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0005955102310238},
isbn={978-989-758-196-0},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 13th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 4: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2016)
TI - A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms
SN - 978-989-758-196-0
AU - Le Bouder H.
AU - Barry T.
AU - Couroussé D.
AU - Lanet J.
AU - Lashermes R.
PY - 2016
SP - 231
EP - 238
DO - 10.5220/0005955102310238