A GAME THEORETIC BIDDING AGENT FOR THE AD AUCTION GAME

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

2011

Abstract

TAC/AA (ad auction game) provides a forum for research into strategic bidding in keyword auctions to try out their ideas in an independently simulated setting. We describe an agent that successfully competed in the TAC/AA game, showing in the process how to operationalize game theoretic analysis to develop a very simple, yet highly competent agent. Specifically, we use simulation-based game theory to approximate equilibria in a restricted bidding strategy space, assess their robustness in a normative sense, and argue for relative plausibility of equilibria based on an analogy to a common agent design methodology. Finally, we offer some evidence for the efficacy of equilibrium predictions based on TAC/AA tournament data.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Vorobeychik Y. (2011). A GAME THEORETIC BIDDING AGENT FOR THE AD AUCTION GAME . In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-8425-41-6, pages 35-44. DOI: 10.5220/0003140900350044

in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart11,
author={Yevgeniy Vorobeychik},
title={A GAME THEORETIC BIDDING AGENT FOR THE AD AUCTION GAME},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,},
year={2011},
pages={35-44},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0003140900350044},
isbn={978-989-8425-41-6},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,
TI - A GAME THEORETIC BIDDING AGENT FOR THE AD AUCTION GAME
SN - 978-989-8425-41-6
AU - Vorobeychik Y.
PY - 2011
SP - 35
EP - 44
DO - 10.5220/0003140900350044