Parallel Possibility Results of Preference Aggregation and Strategy-proofness by using Prolog

Kenryo Indo

2014

Abstract

Classical social choice theory provides axiomatic modeling for collective decision making in multi-agent situations as functions of a set of profiles (i.e., tuples of transitive orderings). The celebrated Arrow’s impossibility theorem (for unanimity-and-independence-obeying preference aggregation) and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (for strategy-proof voting procedures) assume the unrestricted domain as well as the transitivity of orderings. This paper presents a distribution map of all Arrow-type aggregation rules without the unrestricted domain axiom for the two-individual three-alternative case in parallel with non-imposed strategy-proof voting procedures by using a Prolog program that systematically removes profiles in the super-Arrovian domains.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Indo K. (2014). Parallel Possibility Results of Preference Aggregation and Strategy-proofness by using Prolog . In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-758-016-1, pages 243-248. DOI: 10.5220/0004913302430248

in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart14,
author={Kenryo Indo},
title={Parallel Possibility Results of Preference Aggregation and Strategy-proofness by using Prolog},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,},
year={2014},
pages={243-248},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0004913302430248},
isbn={978-989-758-016-1},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,
TI - Parallel Possibility Results of Preference Aggregation and Strategy-proofness by using Prolog
SN - 978-989-758-016-1
AU - Indo K.
PY - 2014
SP - 243
EP - 248
DO - 10.5220/0004913302430248